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International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey
ABSTRACT We argue in this paper that the Arab Spring has opened a window of opportunity
not just to create stability and democracy in one of the most unstable regions of the world, but
also for revitalizing Turkey-EU relations. In theory, Turkey-EU cooperation can make a decisive
difference in determining the outcome of the triangular relationship between stability,
development, and democratization in the Arab region. In normative terms, as an opportunity,
it must be turned into an advantage. From a practical perspective, however, transforming the
window of opportunity into policy output is linked to the policy leadership of the sides involved to
undergo a paradigm shift in their approach to the region and toward one another.
KEY WORDS: Arab Spring, democratization, revitalizing Turkey-EU relations, paradigm
shift, policy leadership
Introduction
Mohamed Bouazizi, a university graduate street vendor, set fire to himself in Tunisia
during the final days of 2010. Though he most probably did not realize it, Bouazizi had
also lit the fuse for a wave of uprisings which drew millions of people into the streets.
Not very long after the people of Tunisia had hoisted the flag of revolt, the country’s
dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was forced to leave the country. Immediately
afterward, President Hosni Mubarak who had ruled Egypt with an iron fist since 1981
was compelled to step down. The Egyptian people displayed historic solidarity,
revolting against their country’s dictator and achieving an unexpected success by
overcoming the collective action problem. In subsequent waves, there were protest
demonstrations in Libya and Syria which turned into bloodbaths, harbingers of a
domino effect which would massively reshape the geopolitics of the Middle East. The
hesitant first steps taken by the Tunisian people at the beginning of the uprisings evolved
in the case of Syria into a determined stand which was undaunted despite all the bloody
counter-measures against it. Although President Bashar al-Assad caused the deaths of
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nearly 20,000 of his people, the Syrians transcended the wall of fear and set their country
on a path from which there is no turning back.1
The popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have been greeted with
astonishment throughout the world. Many researchers, who have in the past
addressed the question of why the ordinary people of this region were ‘‘so singularly
resistant to democratization,’’ (Bellin, 2004, p. 139) have found themselves trying to
understand why the Arab people in the street were suddenly galvanized into action
(see Bayat, 2010). Whatever its cause and no matter how consternation it created, the
Arab awakening has triggered the slippage of a geopolitical tectonic plate, causing a
fracture from which there can be no return to the status quo ante because a new
period has opened. It is not just the relations between Arab regimes and their people
which have been turned upside down, but also the strategies of global powers toward
the region. In this matter, we have faced once more the unavoidable question in
every political economy transformation: Who-gets-what in the Arab Spring? This
study provides an answer to this perennial question along the lines of the Turkey-
EU-Arab world triangle by arguing that Turkey’s increased regional role and the
combination of both the material and technical capacity of the EU along with the
peoples of the region have the potential to influence the direction of the Arab Spring.
It appears that with its growing proactivism and popularity, Turkey has become a
source of inspiration for the people of the region. As some pundits assert, however,
‘‘Turkey seems to punch above its weight’’ (Abramowitz and Barkey, 2009, p. 126–
7). The EU, on the other hand, despite its technical and material capacity, has been
hurt by a loss of legitimacy arising from securitized policies toward the
Mediterranean region which exalted energy interests and the fight against illegal
migration. The Turkey-EU nexus, therefore, could generate a non-zero-sum game in
which the two sides complement each other’s deficiencies and create the possibility
for the Arab world to facilitate the transition to democracy. Yet for this to become a
reality, the rules of the game in Turkey-EU relations need to be redefined.
We aim to provide an insider view by drawing upon wide-ranging discussions and
interviews with Turkish and Arabic specialists on the subject and politicians involved
in it. We also interviewed Western pundits to offer a balanced account.2 The first
part examines the structural bases of the growing influence of Turkey in the Middle
East and North Africa region over the last decade. Discussions of the Turkish model,
in this context, are linked to historical and conceptual milieu. The second part deals
with the evolution of the EU’s policies toward the region in a critical perspective with
special emphasis to the credibility of the EU in the eyes of Arab people. The third
part reveals the complexity of the process in the Arab Spring and discusses the need
of a paradigm shift in order to promote the Turkey-EU partnership to facilitate
democratic transformation in the Arab lands. Hence the aim of this article is not to
offer concrete cooperation mechanisms. Instead we aim to show that the parties need
each other and the countries in the region may take advantage of Turkey-EU
cooperation in their hard journey towards democracy.
Turkey: A Rising, Yet Fledgling Regional Power
There has been a good deal of discussion recently about how much Turkey is a
source of inspiration for the Arab countries (Dede, 2011; Stone, 2011). Many






























Turkish opinion leaders argue that ‘‘Turkey’s difference derives from it being, as it
were, ‘a black swan’ [i.e. something which undermines arguments based on Islam-
democracy polarization].’’3 Accordingly, Turkey has won the applause of the people
of the region to the extent that 73 per cent believes that ‘‘Turkey has become more
influential in the Middle Eastern politics’’ and 66 per cent of them think that
‘‘Turkey can be a model for countries’’ in the Middle East, as TESEV survey reveals
(Akgün et al., 2011, p. 12; see also Telhami, 2011). Furthermore, it is a political actor
which has taken its relations with the Western world to the deepest levels as a
member of NATO, a founding member of the Council of Europe, and a candidate
country negotiating entry into the EU. In Sayyar Al-Jamil’s words, ‘‘Turkey does
provide a model of how to reconcile power in the military establishment with
democracy and a secular system with a religious orientation. It also served as a
model of economic success and a workable culture between East and West.’’4 It
appears quasi-certain that the sympathy which Turkey has won among the people of
many Arab countries is heavily affected by the charismatic leadership of its prime
minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, especially in the post-Davos period.5 We argue,
however, that charismatic leadership and structural political economy dynamics
combine to express a single meaning. We must therefore explore the fundamentals of
Turkey’s rising regional influence, which consist of (1) economic dynamism, (2) the
institutionalized democracy and (3) soft power-driven proactive foreign policy.
The first pillar of Turkey’s rising influence in the Middle East is driven by its
economic transformation. In the years following 2001, Turkey introduced
substantial economic reforms regarding the financial and public side of the economy
(Öniş and Şenses, 2009). The financial system was overhauled comprehensively and a
set of regulatory bodies made the Turkish banking system rise on solid foundations.
In the last decade Turkey’s GDP increased more than threefold and per capita
income surpassed the $10,000 threshold thanks to uninterrupted high growth
performance.
In fact, the 2001 economic crisis, which is by far the biggest in Turkish economic
history having shrunk the GDP by 7.4 per cent, implied that the end of the road had
arrived for many banks accustomed to the rentier mode of capital accumulation
strategies of the 1990s, and they were forced to stop extending ‘‘bad loans to good
friends.’’ In the post-crisis period, pro-integrationist strategies with a competitive
outlook have become the only sustainable option for the Turkish business elite. In a
parallel fashion, alternative economic interest groups, mainly the Anatolian Tigers
Table 1. Turkish Economy, Selected Indicators (2002–2010)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP (US$ Billions) 232.7 304.6 393.0 484.0 529.9 655.9 742.1 617.6 735
GDP Per Capita (US$) 3,403 4,393 5,595 6,801 7,351 8,984 10,745 8,950 10,067
GDP Growth (%) 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.6 0.7 74.7 9
Imports (US$ Billions) 51.5 69.3 97.5 116.8 139.6 170.1 201.0 140.9 185.5
Exports (US$ Billions) 36.1 47.3 63.2 73.5 85.5 107.3 132.0 102.1 113.9
FDI (US$ Billions) 1.08 1.75 2.79 10.03 20.19 22.05 18.27 7.66 9,3
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) 711.47 78.84 75.22 71.06 70.61 71.62 71.97 74.88 73,6
Total Public Debt
(%GDP)
61.4 55.1 49.0 41.6 34.0 29.5 28.2 32.5 42,2






























that export heavily to Middle Eastern countries, have increased their gravity in
Turkey’s output which enabled them to make their voices heard in the decision-
making echelons. During the last decade, the total volume of Turkish trade rose
from $87.6 billion in 2002 to more than $370 billion in 2011. Concomitantly,
Turkey’s economic links with non-Western economies have expanded, notably with
the markets of the Middle East and Central Asia. For example, the EU accounted
for 55 per cent of Turkey’s foreign trade in 2000 but at the end of 2010 the
proportion had fallen to 40 per cent, whereas the share of Asia rose from 18 per cent
to 30 per cent and that of the Middle East had gone up from 8 per cent to 15 per
cent. The volume of Turkish trade with the Middle Eastern and Asian countries rose
from $18 billion to $131 billion over the last ten years.6 In this context, the
dynamism of the Anatolian Tigers, i.e. small and medium enterprises of the
conservative Anatolian cities, has become the practical hand of Turkish foreign
policy in ascertaining Turkey’s regional power capability to solve the conflicts with
its neighbours.
The second pillar of Turkey’s rising influence in the Middle East is driven by its
institutionalized democracy as a Muslim country. Though there are important
defects of Turkish democracy, a point that will be addressed in the following pages,
Turkey has succeeded in terms of establishing electoral democracy for more than
half-century. The reform process which got underway following Turkey’s acceptance
as an EU candidate country in 1999 constitutes a turning point for Turkish
democracy in several respects. In particular, reforms introduced between 1999 and
2006 produced vital advances in the liberalization and democratization of Turkey’s
political and legal structures (Öniş and Bakır, 2007). Turkey enacted two
constitutional and nine legislative packages during an intense Europeanization
period between 2002 and 2006.7 Reforms attributable to the process include, first and
foremost, the abolition of the death penalty, and the right of citizens to publish in
alternative dialects and languages, including Kurdish, which they traditionally used
in daily life (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 55–67). The EU accession process led to a
changing balance in civil-military relations that is documented in amendments of the
duties, functioning, and structure of the National Security Council, an increase in the
civilian presence within it, and emphasis on the Council’s consultative nature
(Sarıgil, 2007). Finally, a new perspective has emerged on the democratic opening,
which aims to solve the deep-seated Kurdish problem in addition to the
improvement of country-wide human rights standards.8 All these improvements
consolidated Turkey’s normative power in the eyes of many Arabs since Turkey has
started to be seen as a pluralist society that proves Islam’s compatibility with
democracy. As al-Ahdab pinpoints;
The Turkish message stemming from a successful experience has an audience in
the Arab world and amongst Islamist groups in particular. With such guidance the
sterile current debate on whether democracy is compatible with Islam will be
void.9
The third pillar on which Turkey’s regional power capacity rests is its proactive
foreign policy. The doctrine of ‘‘Strategic Depth’’ lying emphasis on more
independent policy framework to ‘‘enable Ankara to enhance its freedom of action






























and increase its leverage, both regionally and globally’’ (Larrabee, 2010, p. 159) and
the way in which Turkey has entered a process of political consolidation during the
period the AKP has been in government, freeing the country from the previous
unstable crisis-prone structures, have both made a positive contribution to Turkey’s
rising influence as a regional power in the Arab world. Accompanying economic
dynamism and democratic consolidation, the third important catalyst is the
transformation of the country’s foreign policy identity, which may be described as
a process of ‘‘de-elitization.’’ As Aydınlı argued, the proactivism in Turkish foreign
policy, if examined through the lens of identity transformation underway at the
societal level, can be described as a practice of ‘‘re-elitization’’ following the initial
‘‘de-elitization’’ process.10 The entrepreneurial middle class has come to exert a
relatively more influential position in decision-making mechanisms and thanks to an
integrationist capital accumulation strategy backed by the government; Turkish
entrepreneurs have penetrated Middle Eastern markets (Kutlay, 2011; Kirişci, Tocci
and Walker, 2009, p. 21–2). The mutual interaction of all these transformations in
the Turkish foreign policy identity produced a mentality of ‘‘engagement.’’ This
perception, in turn, has replaced the mentality of ‘‘threat’’ in Turkey’s relations with
its neighbours by positioning itself as a ‘‘benign regional power’’ (Öniş and Yılmaz,
2009). This new outlook perceives the Middle East ‘‘not as a bog from which one
must keep one’s distance but as a historical and cultural extension of Turkey that
provides opportunities to take advantage on.’’11 Therefore, Turkey’s redefining of its
historical and cultural ties with neighbouring countries along the axis of identity has
opened the way to a change in perceptions of neighbours (Dinçer and Aydemir,
2011). In Davutoglu’s words, the new imaginative conception on which Turkish
foreign policy is constructed relies on a multiple-identity definition which gives
‘‘priority to regional integration and cooperation in a mutually inclusive way in
Western and Eastern worlds simultaneously.’’12
The EU: A Wobbling, Yet Key Player
Having witnessed the popular uprisings in the Arab world, it was not only the
pundits who were caught unprepared but also many countries were taken aback by
the developments. The EU heads the ranks of those caught politically unprepared.
For a long time, despite arguments to the contrary, the EU’s influence on countries
in the Arab world has been rather limited. The limitations on its influence do not
arise from any lack of appeal to the peoples of the region or because they see nothing
in the Union to inspire them. The EU has produced several strategic plans and
funnelled large amounts of funds into the Middle East. The Brussels’ master plan
toward the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process, which was later subsumed into
the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereinafter ENP), gave priority to economic
liberalization and security matters. Although the ENP could not succeed in
transforming the Mediterranean region into a free trade area in 2010, it did enable
Brussels to make important material gains. For example, EU exports to countries
included in the ENP rose 63 per cent between 2004 and 2008 and imports rose by 92
per cent. During the same period, total EU trade with the region rose above e200
billion (Grant, 2011, p. 4). This increase, however, did not produce the benefits for
the people of the region that had been intended because in return for trade






























liberalization, the EU relied on authoritarian leaders and toned down its criticisms of
oppressive rulers, and so economic liberalization in a way was hush money to
prevent their legitimacy from being discussed. Therefore as economic interdepen-
dence increased, it was the rulers of the region rather than its peoples who prospered
from it.
Our interviews revealed that in the eyes of many Arab pundits it is hard to claim,
whatever may be officially stated, that the EU’s approach to the Middle East was
very different from that of the U.S. or that it led to any different outcome (see also
Tocci and Cassarino, 2011). The degree of disappointment even dragged some Arab
intellectuals to sensational rhetoric. For example, in al-Hafidh’s words, ‘‘people in
the Arab streets are neither pleased nor have confidence in the U.S. and EU. To
them, there is a lot of hypocrisy in the policy of abandoning dictators in the last
minute following years of endorsement, support and intelligence co-ordinations.’’13
In fact, it led to the tragic point where before the Tunisian dictator escaped to Saudi
Arabia, the French foreign minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, proposed dispatching
French security forces to Ben Ali to prop up the ostracized Tunisian regime (Traynor
and Willsher, 2011).
The second factor going beyond economic self-interest which impelled the EU
member states to cooperate with the authoritarian regimes was the methods that they
employed in the struggle against illegal immigration. It is far from debate that illegal
immigration is a real threat to the socio-economic stability of the EU countries. The
physiological climate created by the 9/11 attacks, however, has consolidated a sceptic
perspective as a result of which immigration has been seen solely from the security-
oriented point of view, and the EU veered into the ‘‘securitization’’ of immigration
policies (see Huysmans, 2000). Accordingly, EU leaders tended to compromise with,
and even demonstrate tolerance toward, authoritarian leaders with whom they had
managed to reach agreement on the subject of immigration and border security. This
situation was neatly expressed in the words of Füle (2011), the EU Commissioner for
Enlargement and Neighbourhood policy;
We must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending
human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey
to the assumption those authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the
region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism and the kind
of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult to build.

























Tunisia 0.698 42.3 3.8 144 59 186 14
Egypt 0.644 52.2 20 138 98 130 9.7
Syria 0.632 55.1 11.9 153 127 178 8.3
Libya 0.760 47.6 33 158 146 193 30
Yemen 0.462 65.4 45.2 146 146 173 35
Algeria 0.698 47.6 23 125 105 141 9.9
Sources: UNDP-Human Development Report (2011), Economist Intelligence Unit (2010)






























Consequently, the one-sided initiatives of the EU were greeted with an unfavourable
reaction from the peoples of the region and categorically rejected regardless of their
real aims. Al-Ahdap expresses this by saying ‘‘Europeans don’t know what we want
and probably do not know how to deal with us.’’14 Therefore, the EU’s soft power
arsenal seems rather limited in effecting transformations in the region.15 Not
surprisingly, a point has been reached where we face the EU functioning well below
its efficiency frontier in the region.
Despite all the deficiencies, if the EU were to thoroughly overhaul its policies
toward this region, it would possess the potential needed to increase its effectiveness
as an active agent of democratic transformation. The areas in which the EU
possesses advantages are twofold. The first is Brussels’ capacity for high-level human
and capital mobilization, arising from its sophisticated institutional political
economy structures. In the contemporary era, despite the euro zone crisis, the EU
ranks as the largest economic bloc, trading power, and official development aid
provider in the world. Under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument, for example, e11.2 billion has been set aside for the period between 2007
and 2013 (Tocci and Cassarino, 2011). It is expected that e4 billion of this funding
will be utilized in the coming three years. In addition to these funds, the EU has
access to further development funding in its associated bodies and has already gone
into action to secure additional funding for the coming period. If used intelligently as
part of a comprehensive strategy, its economic power would be sufficient to make the
EU a centre of attraction for the people of the region. Second, the emphasis which
the EU lays on multilateralism, mainly thanks to its own ontology, could produce an
advantage in terms of enabling the peoples of the region to have a say in the decision-
taking processes via civil society channels and democratic participation. This would
enable the EU to dispose of negative perceptions inherited from the past and bring
its normative strength into play by allowing it to appear as a political actor which
does not impose or dictate but one which listens and accompanies.16 In fact, it is only
by breaking such a psychological threshold that the material instruments that the EU
possesses can become useful as components of its transformational power in the
region. We argue that it is this point which brings out the full importance of Turkish-
EU cooperation in the Arab Spring context.
The Need for Turkey-EU Cooperation: Beyond Reluctant Equilibrium
It is true that Turkey’s historical baggage is quite loaded in the Middle East and
Turkey has a Janus-faced character about exclusion and inclusion when it comes to
its relations with Arab states.17 Nevertheless, especially over the last ten years, the
Islamist-rooted conservative AKP improved Turkey’s positive image in the Muslim
world to a considerable extent. Indeed there are even some analysts in addition to
our Arab interviewees who believe that in a way or another, to some degree it was
Turkey, as a Muslim and democratic country, which inspired the Arab streets.18
Although we believe that this is an overly exaggerated claim, it has a point: Turkey is
a country that proves that democracy and Islam are not mutually exclusive and as
such is a trustworthy ally for the Arab peoples. Yet, Turkey is a medium-sized power
and its capacity is rather limited. When it is compared to the potential which it has,
with respect to the bases of normative power, the material instruments it possesses






























are inadequate to the extent that some scholars aptly label Turkey a country
suffering from the lack of capacity.19 As a proxy indicator for diplomatic capacity,
for example, Turkey has just 135 diplomatic staff in Arab countries in total and only
6 of them can speak Arabic.20
Furthermore, Turkey has domestic problems and despite the progress in the
Kurdish question over the last couple of years, a failure in enacting a new inclusive
constitution may swiftly deteriorate Turkey’s soft power credentials in the eyes of
Arab people.21 In this regard, Turkey like the EU is an actor with a deficit in the
balance between its expectations and capacity. The synergy that cooperation
between Turkey and the EU could create in the region springs precisely from this
point. It is hard to believe that the EU could achieve a substantial transformation
per se because of the negative image it currently has, while Turkey’s room for
manoeuvre is restricted by its limited capacity. If Turkey and the EU do act together,
then it will be easier to boost their capacity and to integrate the countries which are
going through transition into the democratic realm via healthy channels. In any
bilateral mechanism to be set up by Turkey and the EU, if local elements from the
region are included the legitimacy of the mechanisms will become stronger. It would
mean that common problems and common solutions could be identified and most
important of all, a road map could be drafted which would not appear to be
something imposed on the region. Every political actor involved would be able to act
on the basis of shared values. The common purpose must be the public declaration of
the need to consolidate democracy and human rights, broaden freedoms, and accept
a development and security strategy based on these values. Involving local
participation from the region would open the way to proceed in a more fully aware
fashion regarding the expectations and sensitivities of the Arabs.22 The further
involvement of civil society organizations would create a trilateral mechanism able to
overcome any sense that the potential for cooperation had been wrecked by some
feeling that the transformation was being imposed from the outside. If this did not
happen and if there was the perception that the changes were being imposed from the
outside, this would not just damage the initiative we are proposing, it might even
have a negative impact on the transformation process in the region.
Policy Leadership in Hard Times
The window of opportunity which opens the way for major transformations in the
international system and the potential for cooperation, however, are not always
translated directly into the building of relevant political structures. The existence of
policy leadership able to seize opportunities is of vital importance for capitalizing on
the potential in question. In other words, the paradigm shift which the system has
made possible requires strategic intervention at the level of political actors to convert
the opportunity into action. This state of affairs applies not just to what is happening
in the Arab world but is also valid for the EU when it comes to its relations with
Turkey. As Schubs argues ‘‘the relations between Turkey and the EU is in itself of
paramount importance, and it would be regrettable to miss this historical
opportunity.’’23 Yet, a selective concentration on cooperation possibilities only
within the context of the Arab world would be a partial equilibrium analysis. We
offer to place Turkey-EU relations into a general equilibrium analysis context and






























proffer a paradigm shift for both sides to efficiently capitalize on the window of
opportunity opened with the Arab Spring. For as things currently stand, there is no
strategic vision to be discerned in the relations, but rather a tendency just to muddle
through. The EU, deeply puzzled about how it should direct its relations with
Turkey, allows some countries to take the lead in sending Ankara highly
contradictory signals.
After the kick-off of formal negotiations in 2005, Turkey-EU relations have been
running at low ebb because the relations have slacked to a point where they exist in
name but without much substance, seemingly due to the Cyprus question. Since
Turkey did not open its ports on the ground that the EU did not comply with its
promises to lift the bans against the Turkish Cypriot community after the Annan
referenda due to the Greek and Greek Cypriot vetoes, the European Council froze
eight chapters and decided not to close others until Turkey opens its ports to Greek
Cypriot vessels. In the following years, the negotiations further deteriorated since the
former French president Sarkozy unilaterally blocked more negotiating chapters in
addition to the Greek Cypriot veto on six others. German Prime Minister Merkel’s
die-hard stance against Turkey’s membership was the final punch that pushed the
relations into almost a deadlock. The post-2004 period depicted a crystal clear case
of reluctant equilibrium between Turkey and the EU because Ankara aims to
conclude the negotiations as soon as possible and wants to become a member of the
EU, while the Paris-Berlin axis insists on an alternative ‘‘open-ended’’ relationship in
lieu of the full membership prospect. Since neither of the parties is capable of
distorting the existing balance in their favour due to various political economy
reasons, the relations have plunged into a temporary cul-de-sac clearly depicting a
sub-optimal balance (Ugur, 2010). Not surprisingly, as a result, ‘‘all these actions
make Turkey lose faith in the EU and any hopes it has of becoming an EU
member.’’24 Turkey’s counter-response to the EU’s faltering policies has been a
vision shift in terms of its traditional EU policies. The EU membership goal is no
longer the top priority for Turkish policy-makers, and the Turkish foreign policy
elite find the EU to be ‘‘too slow to cooperate at the institutional level.’’25
Consequently, Turkey-EU relations are going through a thorough test of confidence.
Bad Timing: Economic Crisis Knocks Europe’s Door
Beyond the negative impact of sticky ideas, one other crucial impediment to the EU’s
ability to assume a sufficiently proactive role in the Arab world is the deep economic
crisis which it is currently weathering. The economic meltdown had an impact on the
EU’s policies toward the Arab Spring for three reasons. First, the crisis caused the
EU to become more inward-prone both at the institutional level and as far as
member countries were concerned.26
The countries of the EU were busy trying to put their own houses in order and so
they could not divert their energy and resources into foreign relations and the Arab
world. Second, the crisis had led to a financial contraction and belt-tightening
measures which correspondingly reduced the EU’s options in external relations
(Frattini, 2011; Dadush and Dunne, 2011, p. 134). Even though the ENP has been
restructured, the amount of financial assistance now being allocated to the region is
‘‘too little and too late’’ to have much impact (Rettman, 2011). Third, the countries






























of Southern Europe who believed that the EU should pursue an active policy toward
the Mediterranean and North Africa and were making initiatives relating to it have
been the worst-hit victims of the euro crisis. In a sense, the Arab Spring has become
the Mediterranean Autumn.
In view of the wide-ranging structural problems which underlie the euro crisis, it is
clear that the EU does not face an easy future. European integration is used to
difficult times, but even if we make an optimistic forecast that it will somehow be
reborn from the ashes of the euro crisis, it needs to be borne in mind that the time an
economic recovery will take means important opportunities will be missed. The EU
needs new markets, a young demography, and cooperation with dynamic economies.
In this context, a recipe for a recovery may be the Middle East region of which
Turkey is an integral part.
Conclusion
In the 1970s, the EU helped the democratization of Spain, Portugal, and Greece
when they were in the hands of dictators and managed to establish its norms in this
region, which in turn transformed the EU into a Mediterranean power becoming an
active player in Middle East politics (Pinto and Teixeira, 2002; Royo and Manuel,
2003). After the Eastern European countries became independent, they enjoyed the
fundamental advantage of having secured a European perspective for themselves
during the transition process (Smith, 2005). The Arab Spring has opened a new
window of opportunity to achieve a transformation in the Arab world comparable to
that in Southern and Eastern Europe. The recent wave, however, diverges from the
previous ones in a fundamental way in the sense that the EU does not provide
membership prospect in the ENP context and EU’s transformative power is
deteriorated in cases where membership vision is not provided to the countries in
question. Nevertheless, in the Arab Spring, Turkey’s candidacy and active Turkey-
EU cooperation may be substituted as an asset in fulfilling the missing link.
The Arab revolutions began through the dynamics of domestic cleavages, and
their main participants have been the ordinary people of the Middle East who from
now on will be the real architects of their countries’ fates. If the EU were to take a
central part in the process, however, one concerned not just with responsibilities but
also with practical interests, this would make a much-needed contribution to
ensuring that the historical transformation in the Arab world has a successful
outcome in democratic consolidation. Doubtless the transformation in the Arab
world will take many painful years to complete and the ultimate success of
democratization, as Huntington (1991) underlines, depends on a complex web of
factors. The recent wave also has a potential to trigger-back and the transitory
regimes may plunge into another type of authoritarianism as well. Both Turkey and
the EU, in the backyards of which this transformation is taking place, would benefit
from supporting and making a long-term contribution to the democratization
process in the region. After decades of research, we can confidently argue that there
is a causal relationship between economic development and democratic survival
(Przeworski et al., 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). Similarly, favourable
international conditions facilitate the emergence and consolidation of democratic
regimes (Bunce, 2000). It is therefore necessary to support the people of the Arab






























streets and elites to enable this to happen, but to refrain from approaching the region
through the lens of the conventional paradigm and instead respect the choices of the
people of the region.27
Turkey, despite its flaws, as a promising case coalescing Islam and democracy, and
the EU as the world’s largest political economy bloc, giving priority to a normative
foreign policy could create a renewed strategic vision to facilitate the transformation
of the Arab region. Turkey and the EU should both appreciate this window of
opportunity and seize the chance to influence the course for the remainder of the
decade. If the EU continues to treat Turkey as simply a ‘‘crisis to be managed’’ and
sticks to a short-term vision in the way it views this country, the EU will have missed
an important opportunity and may remain a side-line spectator in the Middle East.
On the other side of the coin, if Turkey insists on playing a solo-game, it may come
across the expectations-capabilities gap that disappoints domestic audiences as well
as the peoples of the region. Furthermore, Turkey’s political economy stability may
be jeopardized without a strong EU anchor. Therefore, instead of using one-sided
rhetoric about exclusion, the parties have to start speaking in a constructive language
that makes mutual detente possible. This would not just bring gains for both sides
but also benefits to the world’s most instable political basin.
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6 Dataset is retrieved from Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy.
7 Particularly reform packages regarding the amendment of the constitution articles are very attractive
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December 12, 2011, Ankara.
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14 See note 9.
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17 See note 3.
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23 Authors’ interview with Heiko Schuß, a German scholar from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg
focusing on economy of the Middle East, October 27, 2011, Ankara.
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